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PROLOGUE
This symposium issue of the Chapman Law Review is
devoted to various landmark laws enacted by the 91st Congress,
including the National Environmental Policy Act,1 the Organized
Crime Control Act,2 the Bank Secrecy Act,3 the Controlled
Substances Act,4 and the Housing and Urban Development Act.5
This Article, by contrast, will explore what could have been: The
Family Assistance Act of 1970 (“H.R. 16311”). Had this historic
bill been enacted into law, it would have authorized a negative
income tax, thus providing a minimum guaranteed income to all
poor families with children.6 In the words of Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, “Family Assistance was income redistribution, and by
any previous standards it was massive.”7 Although it passed the
House by a wide margin, and although there were sufficient

* F.E. Guerra-Pujol is a professor at University of Central Florida. He earned his J.D.
from Yale Law School and his B.A. from University of California, Santa Barbara. Thanks to
Caroline Cordova, Jillian Friess, and Antonella Vitulli for their comments and suggestions.
1 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
3 Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1118 (1970).
4 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970).
5 Pub. L. No. 91-609, 84 Stat. 1770 (1970).
6 VINCENT J. BURKE & VEE BURKE, NIXON’S GOOD DEED: WELFARE REFORM 108–09
(1974). This book was the brainchild of Vince Burke, the urban affairs and social welfare
reporter for the Los Angeles Times. See id. at xv. His wife Vee completed the book after
Vince died of cancer in 1973. See id. at xvi.
7 DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 385, 385 (1973).
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votes to clear the Senate, the guaranteed income bill never made
it to the floor of that august body.8
Given that the 91st Congress enacted so many historic laws,
why did H.R. 16311 end in failure? The history of the Family
Assistance Act has received a great deal of scholarly attention.
Previous studies, for example, have surveyed the legislative
history of the guaranteed income bill,9 scrutinized the economics
of the bill,10 dissected liberal and conservative opposition to the
bill,11 or emphasized the spillover effects of the Vietnam conflict
on the bill.12 This Article, by contrast, will narrate the fate of
H.R. 16311 in the form of a three-act legislative morality play. To
this end, this Article is structured as follows:
Act I will introduce the hero of our story, the idea of a
guaranteed income via a negative income tax, and retrace the
intellectual origins of this idea. Next, Act II will spotlight the
shrewd tactics of the second-most powerful man in Washington,
D.C., Representative Wilbur D. Mills, the chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee, who skillfully shepherded the
guaranteed income bill through the House of Representatives.
Last, Act III will introduce the villain of our story, Senator
Russell D. Long, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.
I make no apologies about casting Senator Long as the villain.
This pro-segregation Dixiecrat, who once referred to welfare
mothers as “Brood Mares,”13 used his position of power to thwart
the bill at every turn. A brief epilogue concludes.
Although the hero of our story is an idea, not a person, its fate
will be no less dramatic than that of a traditional flesh-and-bones
protagonist. At the time, many social liberals and welfare advocates

8 For a comprehensive legislative history of H.R. 16311, see CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, Welfare Reform: Disappointment for the Administration, in 1970 CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY ALMANAC 1030 (1970).
9 See generally M. KENNETH BOWLER, THE NIXON GUARANTEED INCOME PROPOSAL:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS IN POLICY CHANGE 6 (1974); Leland G. Neuberg, Emergence and
Defeat of Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (FAP) (U.S. Basic Income Guarantee, Working
Paper No. 66, 2004).
10 See Jonathan H. Hamilton, Optimal Tax Theory: The Journey from the Negative
Income Tax to the Earned Income Tax Credit, 76 S. ECON. J. 860 (2010); see also D. Lee
Bawden, Glen G. Cain & Leonard J. Hausman, The Family Assistance Plan: An Analysis
and Evaluation, 19 PUB. POL’Y 323, 352–53 (1971); Aaron Wildavsky & Bill Cavala, The
Political Feasibility of Income by Right, 18 PUB. POL’Y 321 (1970), reprinted in AARON
WILDAVSKY, THE REVOLT AGAINST THE MASSES 71–100 (2003).
11 See BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 106; see also MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at
384–85; see also Hamilton, supra note 10, at 871–73.
12 See Felicia Kornbluh, Who Shot FAP? The Nixon Welfare Plan and the
Transformation of American Politics, 1 SIXTIES: J. HIST., POL. & CULTURE 125, 125 (2008).
13 See 114 CONG. REC. 10,543 (1968) (remarks by Hon. Walter F. Mondale); see also
MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 518–19. For a more forgiving, or nuanced, view of Senator Russell’s
racist perspectives, see MICHAEL S. MARTIN, RUSSELL LONG: A LIFE IN POLITICS 115–16 (2014).
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complained the bill’s proposed annual stipend was too low, while at
the same time many fiscal conservatives and so-called Dixiecrats
(Southern Democrats) thought the plan was too costly.14 Moreover,
how can a guaranteed income bill help the poor without distorting
work incentives or increasing taxes on everyone else? These are, of
course, mutually incompatible goals. Hence, with apologies to the
late Latin American literary giant Gabriel García Márquez, the title
of this legislative play.15
ACT I: A BEAUTIFUL IDEA
The first act of a dramatic work is usually used for exposition
and to establish who the main characters are.16 At some point
during the first act, an inciting incident or conflict situation will
occur. This incident calls the main character, or protagonist, of
the story to action. The hero will have to make a decision—one
that will change his life forever.
The hero of our three-act play is not a person, however, but
rather an idea: a guaranteed minimum income to all persons via
a negative income tax. The idea of a guaranteed income has an
illustrious pedigree. Historical figures as diverse as Bertrand
Russell, Edward Bellamy, and Thomas Paine—polymath,
utopian planner, and patriot alike—all advocated for some form
of universal basic income in their day.17 But it was the
conservative economist and future Nobel Laureate, Milton
Friedman, along with his wife Rose Friedman, who coined the
term “negative income tax” in a best-selling book, Capitalism and
Freedom, and in the popular press.18
14 The bill’s proposed annual stipend for a family of four was $1,600, or about
$10,000 in 2020 dollars. See infra text accompanying notes 29–30.
15 GABRIEL GARCÍA MÁRQUEZ, CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FORETOLD (Gregory Rabassa
trans., First Vintage International ed. 2003). The Nobel Prize in Literature 1982 was
awarded to Gabriel García Márquez “for his novels and short stories, in which the fantastic
and the realistic are combined in a richly composed world of imagination, reflecting a
continent’s life and conflicts.” The Nobel Prize in Literature 1982, NOBEL PRIZE,
http://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1982/summary/ [http://perma.cc/7WHV-U4N6]
(last visited Feb. 28, 2020). Unlike the great García Márquez, however, I will tell the story of
the Family Assistance Act in a linear fashion.
16 See, e.g., DAVID TROTTIER, THE SCREENWRITER’S BIBLE: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO
WRITING, FORMATTING, AND SELLING YOUR SCRIPT 5–7 (3d ed. 1998).
17 See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROPOSED ROADS TO FREEDOM, 109–10 (2004); see
also Thomas Paine, Agrarian Justice (1797), in JOHN CUNLIFFE & GUIDO ERREYGERS,
EDS., THE ORIGINS OF UNIVERSAL GRANTS 3–16 (2004); EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING
BACKWARD: 2000–1887 (Daniel H. Borus ed., 1995).
18 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191–94 (40th Anniversary ed.
2002); see also Milton Friedman, Negative Income Tax—I (1968), in MILTON FRIEDMAN,
BRIGHT PROMISES DISMAL PERFORMANCE: AN ECONOMIST’S PROTEST 348–50 (William R. Allen
ed., 1972); Milton Friedman, Negative Income Tax—II (1968), in id. at 351–53. Professor
Friedman would be awarded “The Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel” in
1976. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, COLUMBIA
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Although the idea of a reverse income tax predates
Friedman,19 it was Milton and Rose Friedman who brought this
unorthodox idea to a popular audience and made it palatable to
social conservatives. If Capitalism and Freedom was destined to
become Friedman’s most famous work,20 the negative income tax
chapter of his book put forth one of his most original, provocative,
and beautiful ideas.21 In summary, Friedman proposed that the
federal income tax should be graduated—not only upward, but also
downward. Under Friedman’s proposed negative income tax
scheme, a person without any income would receive a modest
guaranteed income of $300 per year.22 Later, Friedman would
revise this amount upward, recommending a minimum guaranteed
income of $1,500 for a family of four.23 Friedman’s negative income
tax thus inspired the 1970 guaranteed minimum income bill: “Had
it not been for Friedman’s endorsement of the basic principles
underlying Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (FAP) . . . it is unlikely
that FAP would ever have left the White House.”24
But if the hero of our story is Milton and Rose Friedman’s
negative income tax idea, what is the inciting incident or call to
action of our doomed legislative tale? One possibility is a May 27,
1968 letter, which was signed by over 1,000 North American
academic economists, calling on Congress to enact “a workable and
equitable plan of income guarantees . . . .”25 This letter, which was
co-authored by a group of leading economists—including such

ECON., http://econ.columbia.edu/faculty/nobel-laureates/the-sveriges-riksbank-prize-in-economicsciences-in-memory-of-alfred-nobel/ [http://perma.cc/96HA-S2KD]. Although Milton Friedman’s
name appears as the sole author on the front cover of Capitalism and Freedom, he wrote
this book in collaboration with his wife, Rose D. Friedman. See LANNY EBENSTEIN,
MILTON FRIEDMAN: A BIOGRAPHY 140 (2007).
19 See BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 140–41. As an historical aside, the first
Anglo-American person to propose a negative income tax as the mechanism for
providing a guaranteed income was Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams. See Peter Sloman,
Beveridge’s Rival: Juliet Rhys-Williams and the Campaign for Basic Income, 1942–55,
30 CONTEMP. BRIT. HIST. 203, 203–04 (2016); see also Evelyn L. Forget, Canada: The
Case for Basic Income, in MATTHEW C. MURRAY & CAROLE PATEMAN, EDS., BASIC
INCOME WORLDWIDE: HORIZONS OF REFORM 83 (2012).
20 According to the University of Chicago Press, for example, Capitalism and Freedom
has been translated into eighteen languages and has sold over 500,000 copies since its initial
publication in 1962. See FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 18.
21 Friedman was one of the most (if not the most) prominent North American
economists at the time. See, for example, the cover of the December 19, 1969 issue of Time
Magazine, which is included in Appendix A to this Article.
22 See FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 18, at 192.
23 See Friedman, Negative Income Tax—I, supra note 18, at 349.
24 See MARTIN ANDERSON, WELFARE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM
IN THE UNITED STATES 78–79 (1978).
25 The letter, along with the list of 1,228 economists who signed the letter, is found
in Income Maintenance Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of the J.
Econ. Comm., 90th Cong. 676–90 (1968). The text of this letter is included in Appendix B
to this Article.
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luminaries as James Tobin (Yale), Paul Samuelson (MIT), and
John Kenneth Galbraith (Harvard)—openly called for a national
system of income guarantees and made the front page of
The New York Times.26 Alas, curiously absent from this massive
list of signatures was Milton Friedman’s.
Why did Friedman demur from the May 1968 letter? Why
did he not join his own colleagues in support of his own cause?
The most likely reason Friedman jumped off this basic income
bandwagon is the letter’s choice of words; it omits any reference
to the words “negative income tax.” Moreover, the May letter not
only calls for a guaranteed income, it also calls for supplements to
this income. In other words, the letter seems to imply that existing
social welfare programs should co-exist with a guaranteed income.
Friedman, by contrast, supported a guaranteed income concept
only if it replaced all, or most, existing social entitlements.27
Here, then, is an alternative inciting incident: President
Richard M. Nixon’s historic speech on August 8, 1969, calling for
a guaranteed income. Between the historic Apollo 11 lunar
mission (July 16–24, 1969) and the Woodstock Music Festival in
Bethel, New York (August 15–18, 1969), Nixon delivered a televised
address announcing one of the most radical and revolutionary
poverty-relief proposals in our nation’s history: a uniform,
unconditional, and guaranteed minimum income for all poor
households in the United States.28 Under Nixon’s anti-poverty plan,
a poor family of four would receive an annual cash stipend of
$1,600—no strings attached—the equivalent of $10,600 in today’s
inflation-adjusted dollars.29
In some respects, the proposal Nixon described in his
nationwide address would fall far short of his lofty rhetoric; in
other respects, however, Nixon’s speech understated the radical
nature of his plan.30 Overall, Nixon’s guaranteed income bill, or
“family assistance plan” (“FAP”), had three internal
contradictions—time bombs that would eventually cause his plan to

26 See Economists Urge Assured Income, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1968, at 1. For
additional background and a chronology of events leading up to the 1968 petition, see
BRIAN STEENSLAND, THE FAILED WELFARE REVOLUTION: AMERICA’S STRUGGLE OVER
GUARANTEED INCOME POLICY 64–70 (2008).
27 For alternative explanations of Friedman’s demurral, see Milton Friedman, The
Case for the Negative Income Tax: A View from the Right, PROC. NAT’L SYMP. ON
GUARANTEED INCOME 49–55 (1966), reprinted in Collected Works of Milton Friedman
Project (Robert Leeson & Charles G. Palm, eds.), HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES,
http://miltonfriedman.hoover.org/objects/57681 [http://perma.cc/6WKA-7WRV].
28 Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, 324 PUB. PAPERS 640–41 (Aug. 8, 1969).
29 See
Ian
Webster,
$1600
in
1970,
CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR,
http://www.in2013dollars.com/us/inflation/1970?amount=1600 [http://perma.cc/448X-LE53].
30 See BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 108–10.
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self-destruct. First, Nixon’s welfare reform plan was a half-hearted
one. His plan abolished only one welfare program (“AFDC”), not the
welfare state in toto as Friedman, William F. Buckley, Jr., and
other conservative proponents of a basic income had called for.31 At
that time, for example, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (“HEW”) was one of the largest agencies in the entire
federal government, with 107,000 employees, a budget of nearly $60
billion, 135 advisory boards, and more than 270 programs, covering
everything from family planning to Social Security.32 Instead of
dismantling this bureaucratic behemoth, Nixon’s bill left HEW
totally intact.33 This omission would later cause Friedman, the
intellectual author of the negative income tax, as well as
Buckley, Jr., James J. Kilpatrick, and other leading conservative
commentators, to withdraw their support of Nixon’s guaranteed
income plan.34
Second, instead of showcasing the basic income aspect of his
plan, Nixon buried it in the middle of his speech. Worse yet, Nixon
bundled his guaranteed income proposal with several other
cumbersome legislative proposals, including a costly revenue
sharing proposal in which, in Nixon’s words, “a set portion of the
revenues from Federal income taxes [would] be remitted directly
to the States . . . .”35 In short, instead of using a negative income
tax to replace existing welfare programs, Nixon was simply
tacking his proposal on top of these existing programs.
Third, Nixon refused to call a spade a spade. He was
unwilling to utter the words “negative income tax,” and denied
that he was proposing a guaranteed income. Instead, he coined
the term “family assistance,” called his plan a “floor,” and tried
to sell it as “workfare.”36 Although Nixon told the nation, “What
I am proposing is that the Federal Government build a
foundation under the income of every American family with
dependent children that cannot care for itself—and wherever in

31 In the words of President Nixon, “Under [my] plan, the so-called ‘adult categories’
of aid—aid to the aged, the blind, the disabled—would be continued . . . .” See Address to
the Nation on Domestic Programs, 324 PUB. PAPERS 640 (Aug. 8, 1969).
32 See Robert Sherrill, The Real Robert Finch Stands Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1970,
at 122; see also MICHAEL KONCEWICZ, THEY SAID NO TO NIXON: REPUBLICANS WHO STOOD
UP TO THE PRESIDENT’S ABUSES OF POWER 122 (2018).
33 See COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1970,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 16311, H.R. NO. 91-904, at 6.
34 See infra Act III.
35 Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, 324 PUB. PAPERS 643 (Aug. 8, 1969).
According to one scholar, the real purpose of this revenue sharing proposal was to make
sure that no current welfare recipient would be worse off under Nixon’s guaranteed
income plan than under the status quo. See Neuberg, supra note 9, at 37.
36 See BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 111–12.

Do Not Delete

5/22/20 8:52 AM

2020] Guaranteed Income: Chronicle of a Political Death Foretold

105

America that family may live.”37 He then made the following
clarification: “This national floor . . . is not a ‘guaranteed
income.’ Under the guaranteed income proposal, everyone would
be assured a minimum income, regardless of how much he was
capable of earning, regardless of what his need was, regardless
of whether or not he was willing to work.”38
This subterfuge was no doubt motivated by politics. After all,
how else could Nixon get conservative members of Congress to go
along with his revolutionary guaranteed income proposal? As
Vincent and Vee Burke wrote in their classic study Nixon’s Good
Deed, “In public affairs the content of a proposal can be less
important than the way it is perceived. Sometimes the label is
the most important ingredient.”39 But at the same time, calling
his guaranteed income proposal “family assistance” invited a
fundamental moral dispute over whose responsibility it was to
provide support to children—the government or parents.40
Furthermore, the label chosen must bear some relation to
the content of one’s proposal. The work requirement in Nixon’s
proposal was riddled with exemptions,41 while the guaranteed
income aspect of the bill would more than double the number of
families eligible for government assistance.42 Perhaps Nixon
would be able to fool some members of Congress with his
“workfare” subterfuge, but as we shall see in Act III, he would
not be able to fool all of them.
Given these internal contradictions, our dramatic question
now boils down to this: will Nixon’s call for a guaranteed
income—now disguised as a “family assistance plan”—be enacted
by the 91st Congress, or will this bill die in committee? Either
way, Nixon’s FAP would unleash an epic, multi-year intellectual
battle between competing political principles and conflicting
ideological worldviews—between social liberals committed to the
cause of eradicating poverty and fiscal conservatives opposed to
government hand-outs and guaranteed minimum incomes.
The remainder of our story will mostly unfold in the bowels of
Congress, specifically, in two of its most powerful congressional
committees—the House Ways and Means Committee and the

Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, 324 PUB. PAPERS 640 (Aug. 8, 1969).
Id. at 640–41.
BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 119.
40 See id. at 161.
41 COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1970, REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 16311, H.R. NO. 91-904, at 4.
42 See BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 110.
37
38
39
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Senate Finance Committee.43 The guaranteed income bill was
referred to these committees because it was, technically
speaking, a tax measure.44 Therefore, our leading protagonists will
now include two Southern Democrats: Wilbur Mills, the chairman
of the House Ways and Means Committee, and Russell Long, the
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.45 In their committees
rested the fate of guaranteed income. Even though the 91st
Congress was controlled by the Democratic Party, and even
though the bill was promoted by a Republican president, the
concept of a guaranteed income “was neither a conservative nor a
liberal measure in the meanings intended by those terms.”46
Would Democrats give Nixon a legislative victory? Would
Republicans support a massive income redistribution bill?
ACT II: MILLS TO THE RESCUE
The second act, or middle section of a dramatic work, typically
portrays a “rising conflict”—one in which the protagonist attempts
to resolve the conflict created by the turning point in the first act,
only to find himself in an ever-worsening situation.47 Act II of
Nixon’s guaranteed income bill, however, does not follow this
tried-and-tested formulaic blueprint. Far from suffering an initial
reversal of fortune, H.R. 16311 sailed through the House Ways
and Means Committee by an overwhelming margin (21 to 3) and
then sped through the full House of Representatives by a
considerable margin (243 to 155).48
These early legislative successes in the 91st Congress were
due in large part to the skillful maneuvering and strategic
tactics of Congressman Wilbur D. Mills, an Arkansas Democrat
who was born in the town of Kensett, Arkansas (population 905)
and who was first elected to Congress in 1939.49 Although his
political career would soon come to a crashing end,50 at this
43 See Top Congressional Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/
revolving/top.php?display=C [http://perma.cc/NH85-2DZ5].
44 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 352 (“Technically it was a tax bill, part of the
social security system. . . . If approved it would be a permanent statute, financed by
automatic claims on the Treasury.”).
45 See
MILLS, Wilbur Daigh, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000778 [http://perma.cc/K5R9-3SSC];
see also LONG, Russell Billiu, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000428 [http://perma.cc/A4EL-C57F].
46 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 440.
47 See, e.g., TROTTIER, supra note 16, at 15.
48 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 1032.
49 See MILLS, Wilbur Daigh, supra note 45.
50 See Richard D. Lyons, Mills Quits as Chairman; Young Democrats Advance, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1974, at 93; see also Laura Smith, In 1974, a stripper known as the “Tidal
Basin Bombshell” took down the most powerful man in Washington, TIMELINE (Sept. 18, 2017),
http://timeline.com/wilbur-mills-tidal-basin-3c29a8b47ad1 [http://perma.cc/B9YZ-4BRC].
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time, Congressman Mills was still the chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee,51 and was thus considered to be
the second-most powerful man in Washington, D.C., or in the
memorable words of one fellow Congressman, “I never vote
against God, motherhood, or Wilbur Mills.”52
Mills’s power and influence were in large part a function of
the committee he chaired since 1958, the House Ways and Means
Committee. In brief, the Origination Clause of the Constitution
requires that all bills regarding taxation must originate in the
House of Representatives,53 and the internal rules of the House,
in turn, dictate that all taxation bills must pass through Ways
and Means.54 To this day, the Ways and Means Committee is still
the chief tax-writing committee of the House, and the members of
this key committee may not serve on any other House committee
unless they are granted a waiver from their party’s congressional
leadership.55 So, when the original version of Nixon’s guaranteed
income bill was first introduced into the 91st Congress on
October 3, 1969, the first draft of the bill (H.R. 14173) was
referred to Ways and Means.56
Between October 15 and November 13, 1969, the House
Ways and Means Committee held eighteen days of public
hearings on the bill.57 But then, on November 13, Chairman
Mills abruptly concluded the public phase of his hearings and
proceeded behind a special closed-door session.58 This was the
first of two pivotal procedural moves Chairman Mills would
make. Rather than drag out consideration of Nixon’s
guaranteed income bill and provide a public forum for
opponents of the bill to raise their objections, the bill would
remain under closed-door consideration until March of 1970.

51 See Lyons, supra note 50, at 1. Before his political downfall, Congressman Mills would
become the longest-serving chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. See Kay C. Goss,
Wilbur Daigh Mills, CALS (Apr. 23, 2019), http://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/wilburdaigh-mills-1715/ [http://perma.cc/2LUA-KQGD].
52 Smith, supra note 50.
53 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
54 See Jurisdiction and Rules: Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means,
WAYS & MEANS COMM., http://waysandmeans.house.gov/about/jurisdiction-and-rules
[http://perma.cc/8SPW-VRLR].
55 See id.
56 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 1031. A few days after Nixon’s
guaranteed income bill was introduced in Congress, Chairman Mills called the first round of
public hearings to order on October 15, 1969. See id. at 1032. In addition to Nixon’s income bill,
the committee also considered a proposal to increase Social Security benefits (“H.R. 14080”). Id.
57 See id. at 1031.
58 For a helpful historical overview of closed-door activities in Congress, see WALTER J.
OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42108, CONGRESSIONAL LAWMAKING: A PERSPECTIVE ON
SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY 2–5 (2011), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42108.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9758-JN47].
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Chairman Mills had “indicated strong reservations about
[Nixon’s] plan” on the final day of public hearings on
November 13, 1969.59 His hesitation was not surprising. After all,
he was a Southern Democrat or “Dixiecrat,” and for various
reasons, the South overwhelmingly opposed Nixon’s radical
proposal.60 Nevertheless, by April of 1970, Mills not only
ultimately voted in favor of the bill, he also helped steer it
through the House.61 What happened behind closed doors
between November 13, 1969, the last day of public hearings, and
April 16, 1970, the day the full House of Representatives
approved the measure? In short, why did Chairman Mills change
his mind?
One reason for Mills’s change of heart might have had to do with
the changing winds of politics. On January 2, 1968, the outgoing
president, Lyndon B. Johnson, had appointed a twelve-member
presidential commission to study the feasibility of a negative income
tax.62 This blue-ribbon committee, chaired by Ben W. Heineman,
issued its report on November 12, 1969.63 At this time, the House
Ways and Means Committee was still holding public hearings on
Nixon’s guaranteed income bill.64 Although the Heineman
commission’s negative income tax proposal ended up being more
generous than Nixon’s FAP bill, the commission supported Nixon’s
plan in principle.65 Also, because the commission was appointed by a
Democrat president, Heineman’s report gave Nixon’s guaranteed
income bill a boost by putting “the national Democratic party more or
less on record as favoring a proposal very like that of the president.”66
Furthermore, in addition to the basic income guarantee, Nixon’s
proposal incorporated other “liberal” features that would have
appealed to progressives, including a complete federal take-over of
social welfare.67
Another reason for Mills’s change of heart was
opportunism: Mills rewrote the bill to his liking. Most everyone
at the time agreed that the current welfare system was broken,
See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 1032.
See BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 146–50. When the bill went to the floor of
the House on April 16, 1970, congressmen from the eleven states that made up the Old
Confederacy voted against the bill by an overwhelming margin of 79 to 17. Id. at 147.
61 See id. at 162.
62 See POVERTY AMID PLENTY: THE AMERICAN PARADOX 78 (1969).
63 See Jack Rosenthal, Income Aid Plan Based on Need Proposed by Presidential
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1969, at 1.
64 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 1031.
65 Under the Heineman plan, for example, the guaranteed income floor for a family
of four would be $2,400, while under Nixon’s plan it was $1,600. See MOYNIHAN, supra
note 7, at 361.
66 Id. at 364. For other possible reasons, see id. at 398–438.
67 See id. at 134.
59
60
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so “[i]f Congress spurned the Family Assistance Plan it would
be responsible for perpetuating the discredited welfare
system.”68 Furthermore, as Vincent and Vee Burke note in their
history of Nixon’s bill, although the term “negative income tax”
was coined by the conservative economist Friedman, the idea of
a guaranteed income was a Democratic idea.69
But at the same time, Mills and his fellow Democrats had to
grapple with the following dilemma: if they supported Nixon’s FAP,
then Nixon would win a big legislative victory. Mills solved this
problem by rewriting the bill to his own liking and making it his
own. Specifically, he made two significant changes to the bill: (1) he
added a new food stamp subsidy to the bill, and (2) he diverted a
greater share of federal funds to the states.70 As originally
drafted, the bill required those states whose welfare programs
paid out higher benefits to families than under Nixon’s proposal
(forty-two states in all) to pay the difference.71 Now, under Mills’s
revised bill, the federal government would agree to pay each
state thirty percent of any additional benefits the states paid out
to existing welfare recipients.72 With these revisions, H.R. 16311
or “The Family Assistance Act of 1970” was approved by the
House Ways and Means Committee on February 26, 1970.73
Mills’s Committee then reported a clean bill to the full House of
Representatives on March eleventh.74
Next, Chairman Mills, who “was known for his excessive
caution, [his] fastidiousness about legislative details, and his
moderation,” had another procedural tactic up his sleeve.75 Once
his bill was reported out of Ways and Means, he proposed a
“closed rule” in order to prevent members of the House from
offering any amendments to the bill on the floor.76 (An “open

See BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 122.
See id. at 123.
70 See id. at 152.
71 See id. at 115.
72 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 1032.
73 MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 425.
74 See COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1970,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 16311, H.R. NO. 91-904. Only
three members of Ways and Means voted against the bill: Al Ullman (D., Oregon), Phil M.
Landrum (D., Georgia), and Omar Burleson (D., Texas). Among other things, the three
dissenters objected to providing a minimum income to the poor: “We do not concur that
the cash incentive approach to welfare is either proven or sound.” See CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 1033.
75 See Smith, supra note 50.
76 See Family Assistance Act of 1970: Hearing on H.R. 16311 Before the Comm. on
Rules, 91st Cong. 162 (1970).
68
69
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rule,” by contrast, would have permitted any member of the
House to propose any amendment to any part of that Act.77)
One member of Congress, David W. Dennis protested that
members were being asked to adopt one of the most far-reaching
measures ever to come before it without the possibility “of being
usefully heard or of changing a single thing on the floor.”78
Representative Dennis said the closed rule procedure treated the
members “as the idiot children of the whole political process,”
while another opponent of the bill, H. Allen Smith, said an open
rule would have permitted an effort on the floor by some
members to raise the $1,600 federal minimum benefit.79 After the
bill is passed, Smith said, the $1,600 will “start growing and from
then on the sky will be the limit.”80
Wilbur Mills, however, did not back down. On behalf of the
House Ways and Means Committee, Chairman Mills made his
closed rule resolution “‘to provide for an orderly procedure’” for
consideration of H.R. 16311.81 Although the vote on April 15, 1970
to adopt the closed rule was a close one (205 to 183), Mills
prevailed.82 The next day the bill went before the entire House of
Representatives, and it passed by a two-to-one margin.83
In short, Chairman Mills used his power and influence to
write up his own bill and steer it through Ways and Means and
the floor of the House, but his swift and skillful maneuvering
may have created a false sense of security among proponents of
the guaranteed income bill. A series of events would conspire to
kill the measure in the Senate Finance Committee, the
“graveyard” of H.R. 16311.84 This historic bill would never make
it out of this critical committee.
ACT III: DEATH BY COMMITTEE
The third act of a dramatic work usually features a climax or
showdown, followed by the resolution of the story’s conflict
situation.85 The showdown, in turn, is the most consequential
moment of the story—the sequence in which the conflict is
brought to its most intense point and where the dramatic

77 See About, H OUSE C OMMITTEE ON R ULES , http://archives115-democratsrules.house.gov/about [http://perma.cc/D88C-6D2G].
78 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 5.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 4.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 213.
85 See TROTTIER, supra note 16, at 16.
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question posed by the story is answered, leaving the protagonist
with a new sense of who they really are.86
Once H.R. 16311 was approved by the House in April of
1970, Nixon’s guaranteed income bill went to the Senate.87 The
fateful showdown will thus take place in the august halls and
stately corridors of the United States Senate. In summary, this
conflict will consist of a titanic intellectual battle between
competing political principles and conflicting ideological
worldviews—between social liberals committed to the cause of
eradicating poverty, and fiscal conservatives opposed to
government hand-outs and guaranteed minimum incomes.
Victim to these powerful and irreconcilable political forces, the
bill would languish in committee for months until its final defeat
on November 20, 1970.88
Why does our guaranteed minimum income story end this
way? What happened between April 16, 1970, when H.R. 16311
sailed through the House, and November 20, 1970, when the
guaranteed income bill finally died in committee? It turns out,
however, that most commentators and scholars have been asking
the wrong question.89 Instead of asking, what killed the income
bill, we should be asking who killed it?
Among the leading culprits is the Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, the junior senator from the State of
Louisiana, Russell B. Long. He delayed consideration of the bill
for months on end, tenaciously outmaneuvered supporters of the
bill on the floor of the Senate, and defeated the bill in the waning
days of the 91st Congress.90 This yellow dog Dixiecrat, renowned
for his “sheer cleverness and cunning,” was the last scion of the
legendary Huey P. Long, the populist politician who was
assassinated in 1935.91
Russell B. Long was appointed to the Senate Finance
Committee in 1953, where he served as chairman of the
committee from 1966 to 1981.92 Like Wilbur Mills in the House,
Chairman Long was a powerful political force to be reckoned
with. In the words of one Congressman, “In the heyday of the

Id. at 16–17.
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 2.
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., Kornbluh, supra note 12, at 136; Neuberg, supra note 9; MOYNIHAN,
supra note 7, at 385; BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 186–87.
90 See generally Alan Ehrenhalt, Senate Finance: The Fiefdom of Russell Long, 35
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1905 (1977).
91 See id.
92 See The Russell Long Chair, LSU L AW , http://www.law.lsu.edu/ccls/about/
russelllongchair/ [http://perma.cc/66NB-W5RW].
86
87
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Southern chairmen, [Long] was at the top of the list of big, strong
figures representing the South who were national leaders that
every president had to deal with. . . . Nothing could happen
without them.”93
Chairman Long called the Senate Finance Committee to
order on April 29, 1970.94 Would history be made? Would the
Senate Finance Committee rise to the occasion? After all, during
the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, Chairman Long was his
party’s Senate floor leader, who helped enact many of President
Johnson’s “Great Society” poverty-relief programs, including the
creation of the Medicare program in 1965.95 But as we shall soon
see, it was one thing to provide services to the poor; a guaranteed
income was a whole different ball game.
Not a single senator spoke a single sentence in support of the
guaranteed income bill.96 The guaranteed income bill was dead on
arrival,97 or in the words of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “The hearings
were a calamity. The senators had all but made up their minds that
[H.R. 16311] would provide disincentives to work . . . .”98 Indeed, by
the second day of hearings, Chairman Long was asking, “Why don’t
we junk the whole thing and start all over again?”99
The then-Secretary of HEW, Robert H. Finch, testified before
the members of the Senate Finance Committee during this first
round of hearings.100 His testimony lasted three days, and during
these three days, leading Democrats and Republicans on the
Committee voiced their opposition to the bill. Social liberals like
Abraham A. Ribicoff did not like the bill because they thought
the $1,600 benefit level was set too low, while fiscal conservatives
like John J. Williams did not like the bill because they thought it
was too costly.101 In the end, H.R. 16311 would die a slow and
painful death, death by delay. Although some last-ditch efforts
were made to save the bill in the final days of the 91st Congress,
it was a classic tale of too little, too late.102

93 See John H. Cushman, Jr., Russell B. Long, 84, Senator Who Influenced Tax Laws, N.Y.
TIMES (May 11, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/us/russell-b-long-84-senator-whoinfluenced-tax-laws.html [http://perma.cc/MMY4-5QP4] (quoting Representative Billy Tauzin).
94 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 453.
95 See Karen Sparks, Russell Billiu Long, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Oct. 30, 2019),
http://www.britannica.com/biography/Russell-Billiu-Long [http://perma.cc/T9S5-HSPR].
96 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 473.
97 Id. at 453.
98 Id. at 469.
99 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 6.
100 See id. at 5.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 12.
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What happened? What went wrong?
In chapter five of his book, The Politics of a Guaranteed
Income, Moynihan identifies three political blocs the guaranteed
income bill would have to win over in order to become enacted
into law: “The Liberal Democrats,” “The Conservative
Republicans,” and the “Southerners.”103 From a purely
Machiavellian or political perspective, it might not have been in
the interest of Democrats to allow a Republican president to
outdo them in social policy.104 For their part, most conservatives
supported the idea of welfare reform and might be expected to
support the president’s bill out of loyalty to the president. But
what about the third bloc identified by Moynihan, Southerners?
In the House, congressmen from the eleven states that made up the
Old Confederacy voted against the bill by a margin of 79 to 17.105
That the Senate Finance Committee was chaired by Russell
B. Long, a Dixiecrat out of Louisiana, thus did not bode well for
H.R. 16311.106 Even before he had called his committee to order
to debate the merits of H.R. 16311, Chairman Long had criticized
the bill’s cost and perverse incentive structure in a speech on the
floor of the Senate on April 23, 1970:
Senators should be aware that the welfare bill before the
Finance Committee today does not solve the problem—it
just makes it cost $4 billion more. Under the bill, a fully
employed father of a family of four with low earnings could
increase his family’s total income if he quit work . . . .107

Furthermore, Chairman Long was not alone in seeing the
bill in moral terms. Another member of the Senate Finance
Committee, Herman Talmadge, a Georgia Democrat who was the
bill’s staunchest opponent, framed guaranteed income as “a work
dis-incentive.”108 In his view, a guaranteed income “would
undermine the best qualities of this nation.”109 Senators Long
and Talmadge were traditional Democrats; they saw themselves
as representing “the working man.”110
Furthermore, if Chairman Long was opposed to the
guaranteed income bill as a matter of first moral principles,
many Republican members of the committee were also worried
See MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 352–75.
Id. at 441.
BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 147. Southern Democrats opposed the bill 60 to
11, while Southern Republicans opposed it 19 to 6. Id.
106 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 393.
107 Id. at 459.
108 Id. at 378.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 362.
103
104
105
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about the mechanical nuts and bolts of the bill. During the second
day of hearings (April 30, 1970), Senator John J. Williams, a
former chicken-feed dealer who was set to retire from politics at
the end of the 91st Congress, pointed out a potential problem with
the guaranteed income bill.111 Based on a series of flawed and
misleading cost-benefit calculations, Senator Williams, the
ranking member of Senate Finance, concluded that the bill
contained perverse anti-work incentives: people would rationally
choose not to work under the bill.112
Stated in simple terms, the problem was this: persons who
received a guaranteed income were also eligible to receive
additional welfare benefits from the government, such as
Medicaid, food stamps, and public housing, but those additional
benefits would be lost in their entirety if one’s income exceeded a
certain threshold.113 At the margin, an increase in earnings of
one dollar would result in a decrease of income of more than one
dollar for many individuals.114
Would the Senate Finance Committee tinker with the bill or
try to fix these problems, or would those problems be used as a
pretext for inaction? Now that Nixon had proposed and the
House had passed a guaranteed income bill, four possible
strategies were available to the members of the Senate Finance
Committee: cooperate, deny, realign, or outbid.115 The most vocal
champion of the strategy to outbid the President was Senator
Fred Harris, a Democrat from Oklahoma. Although Senator
Harris supported the idea of a guaranteed income in principle, he
would repeatedly try to outbid Mills and the House’s guaranteed
income bill, though he ended up voting against the bill.116 Why?
Because the House bill did not go far enough. For him, the glass
was half-empty.
Another possibility was cooperation. Senator Abraham
Ribicoff, for example, a liberal Democrat from Connecticut, was
willing to swallow his political pride and cooperate with the
President and the House to get some form of guaranteed income
enacted into law.117 Indeed, when it became clear that the bill
might die in committee, Ribicoff offered an amendment to
salvage the bill, proposing a “twelve-month period of ‘field

111
112
113
114
115
116
117

See BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 155.
See id. at 154–56.
See id.
See id. at 156.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 446–52.
See id. at 451–52.
Id. at 453.
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testing,’”118 and President Nixon issued a public statement
supporting Ribicoff’s amendment.119
Yet another possibility was realignment. After all, it was
Nixon, a polarizing Republican president, who was proposing one
of the most radical income redistribution programs in United
States history, and it was the House of Representatives, which
was controlled by the Democratic Party, that had just approved a
bill based on Nixon’s historic proposal. But in the end, most of the
members of the Senate Finance Committee would choose to defect.
Simply put, they were openly opposed to the bill on moral grounds.
Why? Because many senators thought that a guaranteed income
would destroy the moral dignity of work—an ethic that was at the
very foundation of Chairman Long’s own worldview.
After this disastrous start in the Senate Finance Committee,
it became clear that no member of Long’s committee supported
H.R. 16311. In fact, Chairman Long suspended the hearings on
the third day and asked Secretary Finch to submit a revised bill
to the committee.120 Alas, Finch was put in an impossible
position, for there was no way of solving the work incentive
problem to everyone’s satisfaction. On the one hand, eliminating
Medicaid, food stamps, and public housing was not politically
feasible. Democrats would not allow that to happen, and
Democrats were the majority party. A cutoff would have to be
drawn somewhere. But where? Any cutoff line would produce a
perverse incentive effect.
Worse yet, in the days and weeks after Chairman Long had
suspended the hearings, a series of external events would conspire
to doom whatever slim chances the bill may have still had in the
Senate. Among other things, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Nixon’s
leading spokesman and political strategist in favor of the bill,
would privately offer to resign; Robert Finch would suffer a mental
health breakdown and would resign as Secretary of HEW; and last
but not least, after several conservative voices would begin to turn
against the bill, President Nixon himself would begin to waver.
The cumulative effect of these tumultuous events—along with
Chairman Long’s shrewd delay tactics—would conspire against
H.R. 16311, putting the fate of this historic bill into jeopardy.
First, one of Nixon’s domestic-policy advisors, Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, quietly offered his resignation on May thirteenth in

Id. at 520.
Id. at 521.
120 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 6; see also Frank C. Porter, Hill
Unit Sends Welfare Bill Back to Finch for Overhaul, WASH. POST, May 2, 1970, at A5.
118
119
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order to resume his academic position at Harvard in the fall.121
According to one historian, Nixon asked Moynihan to stay until
the summer in order “to help get [the guaranteed income bill]
through the Senate.”122 But with Moynihan’s impending
departure, the bill would lose one of its most eloquent supporters.
Second, another champion of the bill, Secretary of HEW
Robert Finch, would resign from his post after suffering a mental
health breakdown in May 1970.123 According to Haldeman, Finch
had agreed to resign as early as June 5, 1970.124 (For what it is
worth, Nixon may have flirted with the idea of appointing
Moynihan as Finch’s replacement at HEW. Although Moynihan
expressed an interest in serving as Secretary of HEW,125 Nixon
eventually appointed Boston-native Elliott Richardson to this
position.) But Finch’s departure and Moynihan’s impending
resignation were not the only bad omens. One of the intellectual
authors of the negative income tax, the conservative economist
Friedman, openly withdrew his public support of the bill and
applauded Senator Long’s decision to suspend the hearings.126

121 STEPHEN HESS, THE PROFESSOR AND THE
IN THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE 129 (2015).

PRESIDENT: DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

122 Id. This account is confirmed by a diary entry of H.R. Haldeman. Haldeman, who
served as President Nixon’s Chief of Staff, kept a daily diary throughout his entire career in
the Nixon White House (January 18, 1969 to April 30, 1973). An abridged version of these
diaries was published as The Haldeman Diaries after Haldeman’s death. See H. R. Haldeman
Diaries, RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/h-rhaldeman-diaries [http://perma.cc/ATK8-BT5D] [hereinafter Haldeman Diaries]. According to
Haldeman’s entry for May 13, 1970:
[Nixon] met privately with Moynihan, who said he feels he has to leave. Wants
to go July 1, but President got him to stay until August. Will then return to
Harvard—on grounds his two years will be up soon and he wants to start the
fall semester. President appears more relieved than concerned to have him go,
and this timing should work out pretty well because he always said he was
only here for two years.
Haldeman Diaries (May 13, 1970), http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/
documents/haldeman-diaries/37-hrhd-journal-vol05-19700513.pdf [http://perma.cc/XPB2-RCWR].
123 Haldeman’s May 21, 1970 diary entry states that “[Nixon was] concerned
regarding Finch’s health problem, and [is] now convinced he should move out of HEW.
Wants Tkach to sell [Finch] on the basis of health. [Finch] is going to Florida to try to
recuperate.” Haldeman Diaries (May 21, 1970), http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/
virtuallibrary/documents/haldeman-diaries/37-hrhd-journal-vol05-19700521.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KHY9-PX32].
124 Haldeman’s June 5, 1970 diary entry begins with the words “Finch day.”
Haldeman then goes on to write: “Ehrlichman and I met with [Finch] in morning, and I
made pitch regarding need for him to move out of HEW now. . . . He was obviously ready
for it, and went along completely. He felt it should be done as fast as possible—so we went
to work on a successor.” Haldeman Diaries 1 (June 5, 1970), http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/
sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/haldeman-diaries/37-hrhd-journal-vol05-19700605.pdf
[http://perma.cc/838V-9ZQ4].
125 Id. at 2.
126 See Milton Friedman, Welfare: Back to the Drawing Board, NEWSWEEK, May 18,
1970, at 89.
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In his Newsweek column of May 18, 1970, Friedman identified
several problems with the House version of his negative income
tax proposal.127 But the most fundamental objection Friedman
raised was this: “A negative income tax—which is what the Family
Assistance plan is—makes sense only if it replaces at least some of
our present rag bag of programs. It makes no sense if it is simply
piled on other programs.”128 Moreover, Friedman was not the only
conservative public intellectual to defect. On April 15, 1970, the
conservative commentator William F. Buckley explained in his
nationally-syndicated newspaper column why he too was casting a
“reluctant ‘nay’” against the bill.129 Although Buckley was at first
open to the idea of a guaranteed income, he had now decided that
Nixon’s bill was a bad idea.130 According to Buckley, the bill was
adding a new and costly welfare program on top of existing social
welfare programs, such as public housing, Medicaid, etc., instead
of sweeping these old programs away.131 In addition, Buckley saw
through the bill’s watered-down work requirement, disparaging
it as “merely . . . boob-bait for conservatives.”132
Another leading conservative commentator, James J. Kilpatrick,
went even further. In his syndicated “Conservative View” column of
January 15, 1970, Kilpatrick not only retracted his initial praise of
Nixon’s proposal; he referred to welfare recipients as “parasites”:
If the Nixon plan were adopted, the present $5 billion in annual
federal payments would at least double. . . . Instead of 9.6 million
persons on welfare, we would have nearly 22 million. . . . These would
be the permanent poor feeding like parasites on the body politic unto
the end of time.133

To make matters worse, Nixon himself may have turned
against his own guaranteed income bill. According to his loyal
Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, by July of 1970 Nixon had come
to the realization that his bill was too costly. The entry in
Haldeman’s diary for Monday, July 13, 1970 states, “Regarding
Family Assistance Plan, [Nixon] wants to be sure it’s killed by
Democrats and that we make big play for it—but don’t let it pass,
127 Id. According to Friedman, one problem with Chairman Mill’s version of the bill
was his decision to reinsert food stamps into the plan instead of abolishing the food stamp
program altogether. The other problem, which echoed Senator Williams’s objection during
the initial Senate Finance hearings, had to do with the phasing out of state supplemental
payments under the House bill. Instead of phasing out these supplemental payments
incrementally as the income of an eligible family went up, these payments were phased
out too drastically. Id.
128 Id.
129 MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 370.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 BURKE & BURKE, supra note 6, at 134.
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can’t afford it.”134 Although Haldeman’s diary entry does not
specify whether the bill was too costly in political terms (the
potential loss of support from working class voters), or too costly
in financial terms (the bill’s price tag), or both, Chairman Long’s
delay tactics, Finch’s abrupt resignation, and Moynihan’s
impending departure would conspire to defeat the bill by the end
of the year.135
In any case, on the same day that Chairman Long suspended
the hearings (May 2, 1970), President Nixon appointed a special
committee to revise the guaranteed income bill.136 The revisions,
which were announced on June tenth, were a mishmash of costly
measures that would fail to appease social liberals or mollify
social conservatives.137 Among other things, the food stamp
program was expanded.138 Additionally, “[t]he penalty for
‘Refusal to Register for or Accept Employment or Training’ was
increased from $300 to $500.”139 A “hold harmless” provision was
added, such that no state would be required to spend more on
welfare than under the existing system.140 But the most
significant change to the bill was a proposed comprehensive,
compulsory, single-payer Family Health Insurance Program,
which would have been “the nation’s first federally subsidized
system of health insurance for the poor.”141
In short, instead of streamlining or simplifying the
guaranteed income bill, HEW had decided to superimpose a grab
bag of costly programs and cumbersome requirements on the old
134 Haldeman Diaries (July 13, 1970), http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/
virtuallibrary/documents/haldeman-diraries/37-hrhd-journal-vol05-19700713
[http://perma.cc/57PJ-A9FA].
135 In public, however, Nixon continued to profess his support of the bill. On
August 28, 1970, for example, Nixon agreed to a proposal by Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff
(D., Conn.) to test the plan for one year in three areas of the country. “In a statement
issued at San Clemente, Calif., Mr. Nixon said, ‘The present legislation is too far
advanced, the need for reform is too great,’ for time to run out on the proposal.”
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 5–6. In addition, Nixon invited several key
members of the Senate Finance Committee and their wives to the “Western White House”
in San Clemente, California, and to an official State Dinner at the Hotel Del Coronado in
San Diego, California on September 3, 1970, including three Democrats—Chairman
Russell Long (D., La.), Harry Byrd (D., Va.), and Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.), and three
Republicans—Wallace Bennett (R., Utah), Jack Miller (R., Iowa), and Paul Fannin (R.,
Ariz.). Richard Nixon, President Richard Nixon’s Daily Diary, RICHARD NIXON
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (Sept. 3, 1970), http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/
default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/PDD/1970/035%20September%201-15%201970.pdf
[http://perma.cc/N85Z-EVWN].
136 MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 490.
137 See Neuberg, supra note 9.
138 MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 493.
139 Id. at 495.
140 See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS 83 (1979).
141 MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 490.
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system.142 When the hearings finally resumed on July 21, 1970,
Chairman Long concluded, to no one’s surprise: “In significant
respects the new plan is a worse bill—and a more costly bill than
the measure which passed the House.”143 Suffice it to say, Long’s
committee would never report this now-monstrous bill to the floor
of the Senate. Instead, the chairman devised a devious strategy to
kill the measure: unceasing delay via endless public scrutiny.144
In fact, when the Senate Finance hearings resumed in
July 1970, Chairman Long had decided from the get-go to further
delay consideration of the revised bill until after the midterm
elections.145 The Senate, in the cynical words of Senator Long,
would be able to “give the plan more thoughtful consideration in
the public interest if the bill came up in November.”146 More
importantly, in contrast to the bill’s swift and stealthy approval
in Wilbur Mills’s Ways and Means Committee, consideration of
the bill in the Senate Finance Committee remained open to the
public. By extending the hearings for weeks on end and inviting
dozens of witnesses to testify before the committee, the sundry
imperfections of the bill came to the fore.
Long’s devious delay tactics would seal H.R. 16311’s fate.
Long’s committee called over two dozen public officials
representing a wide variety of local and state governments, as
well as a long laundry list of representatives from the business
world, labor unions, and other public interest groups.147 The
Id. at 503.
Id. at 506.
144 Or, in the words of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “Delay now became an open tactic of
those opposed to [the guaranteed income bill] and time the greatest enemy of those who
supported it.” Id. at 512.
145 Recall that Chairman Long had suspended the hearings on May 1, 1970.
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 6–7.
146 Id. at 5. For his part, Moynihan had been hoping for Senate action before
Congress recessed on October fifteenth for the midterm election campaign. See
MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 521.
147 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 8, at 9–13. In all, the following
individuals representing the following organizations testified before the Senate Finance
Committee between July 21 and September 10, 1970: James D. Hodgson, Secretary of
Labor; John O. Wilson, Director, Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation, Office of
Economic Opportunity (“OEO”) (Wilson was asked to testify on the New Jersey graduated
work incentive project being conducted by the OEO); Keith E. Marvin, Associate Director,
Office of Policy and Special Studies, General Accounting Office; John V. Lindsay, Mayor of
New York City; W. D. Eberle, President of American Standard and Co-Chairman of
Common Cause (a new citizens’ lobby formed by the leaders of the National Urban
Coalition); Leonard Lesser, Committee for Community Affairs (a nonprofit corporation
representing community organizations of the poor); Harold W. Watts, Professor of
Economics and Director, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin; Mrs.
Richard M. Lansburgh, President, Day Care and Child Development Council of America
Inc.; Mrs. Edward F. Ryan, National Congress of Parents and Teachers; Andrew J.
Biemiller, Director of legislation, AFL-CIO; Whitney M. Young Jr., Executive Director,
National Urban League, and President, National Association of Social Workers; John E.
142
143
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cumulative effect of all this nitpicking public testimony was to
slow down the bill’s momentum and reinforce the senators’
various biases against the bill. Given the sheer number of witnesses
and the diversity of opinion expressed by them, the bill suffered a
death by a thousand cuts in Chairman Long’s Finance Committee.
Unable to survive the glare of public scrutiny or the paralysis of the
delay, H.R. 16311 would eventually die in committee.148
The irony of the situation is that President Nixon probably
had enough votes in the full Senate to get his guaranteed income
bill approved. According to Moynihan, at least sixty senators
would have voted for the bill had it reached the floor of the
Senate.149 If there were only a way to get the bill to the floor of
the Senate.
With time running out and just a few weeks left in the 91st
Congress, Senators Ribicoff and Bennett signaled their intention to
offer a guaranteed income bill as a floor amendment to a different
bill that would reach the full Senate, an omnibus Social Security bill
providing a ten percent across-the-board increase in Social Security
payments.150 But in addition to the Ribicoff-Bennett amendment,
many other controversial legislative proposals were added to the
Social Security bill, including a supplemental authorization for
additional foreign aid as well as a new protectionist trade policy
with import quotas on foreign goods.151 These additional
amendments would seal the fate of the guaranteed income bill.
When Chairman Long introduced the Social Security bill on
December sixteenth, Senators Ribicoff and Bennett announced their
intention to offer their guaranteed income amendment to the bill the
next day during floor debate. The Vice President was even put on
alert in case of a tie.152 Alas, it was not to be. A filibuster broke out
Cosgrove, U.S. Catholic Conference, testifying for the Conference, the National Council of
Churches and the Synagogue Council of America; Howard Rourke, Director of the
Department of Social Services, Ventura County, California, testifying for the National
Association of Counties; Carl B. Stokes, Mayor of Cleveland, testifying for the National
League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors; Karl T. Schlotterbeck, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce; A. L. Bolton Jr., President of Bolton-Emerson Inc., Lawrence, Mass.,
representing the National Association of Manufacturers; William C. Fitch, Executive
Director, National Council on the Aging; Frederick S. Jaffe, Vice President, Planned
Parenthood-World Population; Warren E. Hearnes, Governor of Missouri and chairman of
the National Governors’ Conference; Tom McCall, Governor of Oregon; George McGovern,
a U.S. Senator from South Dakota; Joseph C. Wilson, Chairman of the board, Xerox
Corporation, testifying for the Committee for Economic Development. Id.
148 The final vote in the Senate Finance Committee was 10 to 6 against the bill. Id. at 13.
Since Chairman Long was able to cast his vote last, he voted for the bill knowing full well that
it lacked sufficient votes to be reported out of committee. Id.
149 MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 518, 525.
150 Id. at 537.
151 Id. at 537–38.
152 Id. at 538.
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over the foreign aid amendment, and another filibuster was
threatened over the import quotas.153 In the end, the Ribicoff-Bennett
amendments were never voted on.154 Their last-ditch efforts failed.
Time ran out, and the bill perished in the Senate on the last days of
the 91st Congress.155 Guaranteed income was dead.
EPILOGUE
This Article retold the story of H.R. 16311, “The Family
Assistance Act of 1970,” the historic guaranteed income bill
proposed by President Nixon in the summer of 1969 and enacted
by the House in April of 1970, only to die in the Senate in the last
days of the 91st Congress. To provide structure to this story, this
Article presented the rise and fall of the guaranteed income bill in
three dramatic acts featuring such dramatis personae as Milton
and Rose Friedman, Wilbur Mills, and Russell Long, all of whom
played leading roles in this legislative morality play. Here,
however, I want to conclude this compelling story by asking a
normative question. Specifically, why should the ill-fated history of
H.R. 16311 matter to us today? After all, this political theater took
place several generations ago; the leading players are all dead.
What lessons, if any, can we learn from this legislative debacle?
A lot! Given the resurgence of Universal Basic Income
(“UBI”) proposals in our day,156 the rise and fall of H.R. 16311
offers a compelling case study into the politics of guaranteed
income. As Moynihan taught us long ago, “income redistribution
goes to the heart of politics: who gets what and how . . . .”157 So, if
you are a proponent of UBI or are merely sympathetic to this
idea, you will want to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.
But, by the same token, if you are opposed to UBI or are just
skeptical of this idea, the story of H.R. 16311 provides an
instructive political playbook for how to defeat such proposals.
Although the idea of a basic income or UBI can be located “at
almost any point on a spectrum ranging from a prudent and cautious
[i.e., incremental] reform of welfare payments to a climactic abolition

Id.
Although the Senate unanimously approved the omnibus Social Security bill—without
the import quotas, foreign aid, or guaranteed income amendments—on December 29, 1970, the
bill died in conference committee. Id. at 538 n.1.
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., Howard Reed & Stewart Lansley, Universal Basic Income: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come?, COMPASS (May 23, 2016), http://www.compassonline.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/UniversalBasicIncomeByCompass-Spreads.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9E38-BC3K]; see also Jurgen De Wispelaere & Lindsay Stirton, The
Many Faces of Universal Basic Income, 75 POL. Q. 266, 266 (2004).
157 Id. at 355.
153
154
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of the wage system,”158 in the end H.R. 16311 was negatively framed
by its opponents in moral terms: the bill paid people not to work. As a
result, the leading lesson of this affair is: any realistic UBI proposal
must somehow find a way of passing an impossible political test
before it will ever be enacted into law. How can a government provide
a meaningful income to the poor, let alone a universal income to all
persons, without distorting work incentives and without breaking the
bank, so to speak?
Stated bluntly, what is the optimal amount of income that
each person should be entitled to? Consider for the last time “The
Family Assistance Act of 1970.” Was the proposed $1,600 annual
cash stipend for a family of four—the centerpiece of the bill—too
generous and costly, or was it too stingy and miserly? This
inherent contradiction, not to mention the delicate questions of
race and class looming in the background, cursed H.R. 16311
from the get-go; this contradiction also bedevils all universal
basic income schemes today. Supporters of contemporary UBI
schemes should take this inherent tension to heart. Unless they
can solve this puzzle (how to finance such schemes without
distorting the incentive to work), any attempt to enact a
universal basic income is most likely doomed to fail.

158

MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 441.
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Appendix A159

159

TIME MAGAZINE, Dec. 19, 1969 (noting the presence of Milton Friedman on the cover).
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Appendix B160

160 Income Maintenance Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy
of the J. Econ. Comm., 90th Cong. 676–90 (1968).
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Appendix C161

161 Richard M. Nixon, Remarks at the Opening Session of the White House Conference
on Children, 6 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1677, 1683 (Week
Ending Saturday, Dec. 19, 1970).

